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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1974

No. A-609

MARVIN MILLER, COVINA PUBLISHING, INC., a corporation doing business as COLLECTORS PUBLICATIONS, THE COLLECTORS CLUB, and G & M ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

To the United States Supreme Court, October Term 1974:

The petitioners, MARVIN MILLER, COVINA PUBLISHING, INC., THE COLLECTORS CLUB and G & M ENTERPRISES, INC., pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed November 6, 1974.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in the appendix hereto (Appendix A). No opinion was rendered by the District Court for the Central District of California. The opinion of the Court of Appeals of November 6, 1974, reaffirmed the previous convictions and adopted a previously reported opinion at 455 F.2d 899.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was entered on November 6, 1974, reaffirming appellants' conviction of violation of §§ 1461 and 1462 of Title 18, United States Code (Appendix B–letter from the Office of the Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). A timely Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was denied January 6, 1975 (Appendix C–Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, etc.). An application for extension of time within which to file this petition was granted by the Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr., on January 27, 1975, extending such time to March 6, 1975 (Appendix D–Order Extending Time, etc.). The Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and Rule 22(2).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether §§ 1461 and 1462 of Title 18, United

States Code, are unconstitutional as applied to petitioners and violative of the First, Ninth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. Whether a jury trial is constitutionally mandated in every federal prosecution brought pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., §§ 1461 and 1462.

3. Whether the constitutional vagueness of Title 18, U.S.C., §§ 1461 and 1462, prior to the "authoritative construction" in *Hamling v. United States*, ... U.S. ..... , 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974), precludes as a matter of law the establishment of scienter on behalf of petitioners.

4. Whether the imposing of incarceration pursuant to the conviction in the instant case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Code, Title 18:

Section 1461 declares unmailable:

> "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and . . . Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained . . . ."

And further delcares that—

"Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section to be non-mailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . . "

Section 1462 provides in part:

"Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce—(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . . "

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 16, 1969, defendants MARVIN MILLER and COVINA PUBLISHING, INC. (dba COLLECTORS PUBLICATIONS, THE COLLECTORS CLUB, and G & M ENTERPRISES, INC.) were charged by indictment numbered 4660 with twenty-five counts of mailing obscene matter and/or mailing advertisements for obscene matter, and two counts of interstate transportation

of obscene matter (CT[1] 1 - 27).

On December 5, 1969, defendants filed, *inter alia*, Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, on the ground that all of the material in issue was constitutionally protected under the decisions applying First Amendment protection to comparable material (CT 30 - 50). This motion was supported, in part, by Affidavit of Carolyn Sturak, also known as Carolyn See, filed on January 9, 1970 (CT 51 - 58). Denial of the motion occurred on January 19, 1970 (CT 74).

The parties waived trial by jury on June 14, 1970 (CT 132) and entered into a stipulation reducing the actual testimony of thirty-four prosecution witnesses to a stipulated content.

At the commencement of trial, on February 2, 1971, defendants submitted a Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss certain counts, on the grounds that the material in issue on said counts was constitutionally protected by the First Amendment and by virtue of the progeny of *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557. Said motion was not ruled upon by the court as a Rule 12 motion (RT[2] 4 - 8) but was ruled upon and denied as a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 at the close of the prosecution's case (RT 203).

On February 3, 1971, the court found the defendants guilty on Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 24. There was a dismissal as to Counts 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 15, 17, 25, 26 and 27. The court found the defendants not guilty on Count 23 (RT 204 - 211; CT 3, 16).

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[1] "CT" refers to the Clerk's Transcript on Appeal.

[2] "RT" refers to the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.

A timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was filed with this Honorable Court. On or about June 25, 1973, this Court, in a Memorandum Order, granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remanded the case to that Court of Appeals for further consideration (413 U.S. 913).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set the matter for hearing *en banc*. This order was rescinded by order of the Court of Appeals filed October 4, 1974, returning the matter to the original panel for disposition. That panel thereafter reaffirmed the conviction in the opinion filed November 6, 1974 (Appendix A) and adopted the previously reported opinion at 455 F.2d 899. A Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc was denied January 6, 1975. An order extending the time to file this petition was obtained from the Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr. on January 27, 1975.

A detailed statement of the case and of the facts is contained in the previously filed petition for writ of certiorari filed in the October Term 1971, which bears Supreme Court No. A-1066.

REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT

1. In *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), this Court announced new standards for determining the obscenity *vel non* of sexually oriented materials. The Court held that–

> "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person,

> applying contemporary community standards,' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." (413 U.S. at ....., 93 S. Ct. at 2615.)

At the same time, the Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Believing that the aforementioned guidelines would provide "fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution," the Court held that–

> "No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct *specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed.*" (Emphasis added.) (413 U.S. at ....., 93 S. Ct. at 2616 - 2617.)

In another case decided the same day as the *Miller* case, *United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8 mm Film, et al.*, 413 U.S. ....., 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973), this Court held that the "standards for testing the constitutionality of state legislation regulating obscenity . . . are applicable to federal legislation" (413 U.S. at ....., 93 S. Ct. at 2670). Thus, the Supreme Court indicated that federal statutes purporting to regulate obscenity (to wit, §§ 1461 and 1462 of Title 18, United States Code)

must be judicially construed according to the standards set forth in *Miller v. California, supra.*

In the case of *Hamling v. United States,* ..... U.S. ..... , 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974), the Court stated that § 1461 "did not offend the free speech and free press guarantees of the First Amendment and that it did not deny the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because 'too vague to support conviction for crime'."

The statement of the Court is strange and difficult to comprehend. *Roth* is cited as the basis for upholding the constitutionality of § 1461 and, concomitantly, the conviction of petitioners in *Hamling,* and yet *Roth* never authoritatively construed § 1461.

> "The thrust of the argument is that these words are not sufficiently precise because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all the time, everywhere.
>
> "Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process."
>
> *Roth v. United States,* 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1312.

This lack of precision in the statute, which was upheld as constitutional in *Roth,* is exactly what has been proscribed and determined to be unconstitutional in *Miller.* Thus, the prevision of regulation in order to support the constitutionality of a statute, as required by the Court in *Miller* for state statutes, and which has already been shown to apply to federal statutes through *United States v. 12 200-Foot*

Reels of Film, supra, has been completely dispensed with in *Hamling*–decided well after *Miller v. California.* Furthermore, *Hamling* purports to be totally consistent with the *Miller* decision. Yet, the Court in *Hamling* skirts around the requirements set forth in *Miller* for judging the obscenity *vel non* of sexually oriented materials and relies wholly on the *Roth* decision, which does not define, with any language even approaching specificity, the kinds of materials which could be found to be obscene.

Assuming that, even after the decision in *Miller v. California, supra,* the *Roth* standards are not too vague to support a criminal conviction, nevertheless, there is a line of judicial decisions which specifically hold a wide variety of sexually oriented materials to be protected under the First Amendment; i.e., to be not obscene. These materials are of the same or similar character as those involved in the instant appeal. Thus, if *Roth* is still good law, notwithstanding the rejection of the "utterly without redeeming social value" criterion and the replacement thereof with "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" criterion, then the instant conviction must be overturned. This is so because petitioners were relying on prior judicial decisions which held that similar acts were constitutionally protected. And this reliance is a valid defense.

Petitioners' actions were taken in good faith and in reliance on court decisions interpreting statutory prohibitions. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 177 - 178, § 96, "Reliance on Judicial Decisions."

If, however, the effect of *Hamling* is to overrule these prior decisions affording protection to these materials,

then the conviction must also be overturned, because it punishes as criminal conduct acts which were previously protected. To do otherwise would be to countenance an *ex post facto* law, which is prohibited under Article 1, § 9 of the United States Constitution.

> "It is not necessary to review the numerous cases in which the courts have determined whether particular statutes come within the constitutional prohibition of *ex post facto* laws. It is sufficient now to say that a statute belongs to that class which by its necessary operation and 'in its relation to the offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.' *United States v. Hall*, 2 Wash. C.C. 377, Fed Case No. 15,285; *Kring v. Missouri*, 197 U.S. 221, 228, 2 S. Ct. 443; *In re Medley*, 134 U.S. 160, 171, 10 S. Ct. 284. Of course, a statute is not of that class unless it materially impairs the right of the accused to have the question of his guilt determined according to the law as it was when the offense was committed."
>
> *Thompson v. State of Utah*, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 623 (1898).

At the very most, the material in question, which formed the basis for the instant conviction, may be suppressed or forfeited on a civil basis only. *Astol Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.*, ... U.S. ..... , 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).

This Court analogized forfeiture statutes to *in rem* proceedings which historically operate without regard for any related innocent or criminal conduct. The Court quoted

Mr. Justice Story in *The Palmyra*, 25 U.S. 1, 12 Wheat. (1827):

> " . . . [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understands the law to be, that the proceeding *in rem* stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding *in personam*." (25 U.S. at 14 - 15, 94 S. Ct. at 2092.)

A reading of the *Calero-Toledo* case leads one inevitably to the conclusion that the Supreme Court decisions in *Roth*, *Miller* and *Hamling* employed standards which can only be applied to civil forfeiture cases.

To sustain the conviction of petitioners in the instant case, based on a non-specific statute which at the time of the conviction had not yet been authoritatively construed, would be to deny due process. Criminal statutes must give fair and clear notice as to exactly what kind of conduct is proscribed in order to be constitutionally upheld. *Lambert v. California*, 355 U.S. 226, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957).

Assuming, *arguendo*, that §§ 1461 and 1462 of Title 18, United States Code, have now been authoritatively construed as a result of this Court's decision in *Hamling*, *supra*, no such authoritative construction was available at the time of petitioners' conviction in February of 1971 and, more importantly, at the time of the commission of the supposed offense.

2. The Central District of California is comprised of a large number of significantly different communities, which reflect wide-ranging social, political and economic views. This unavoidable and easily understandable diver-

gence of viewpoints represents a collective wisdom and judgment that no single federal trial judge can possibly possess. This Honorable Court, in *Miller v. California, supra,* recognized this fact and stated that:

> "In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law, *we must continue to rely on the jury system,* accompanied by the safeguard that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence and other protective features provide, as we do with rape, murder, and a host of other offenses against society and its individual members." (Emphasis added.) (413 U.S. at ..... , 93 S. Ct. at 2616.)

Mr. Justice Rehnquisht, in delivering the opinion of the Court in *Hamling, supra,* stated that–

> "A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a 'reasonable' person in other areas of the law . . . .
>
> "The result of the *Miller* cases, therefore, as a matter of constitutional law and federal statutory construction, is to permit a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what conclusion 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards,' would reach in a given case."(.....

U.S. ....., 94 S. Ct. at 2901.)

While this statement may be effective and applicable in other jurisdictions, it is completely contrary to established California law. The California Supreme Court in *In re Giannini*, 69 Cal. 2d 563 (1968), stated that:

> "Relying principally on the well established doctrine that a juror should not be endowed with the prerogative of imposing their own personal standards as the test of criminality of conduct, we hold that expert testimony should be introduced to establish community standards. We cannot assume that jurors in themselves necessarily express or reflect community standards; we must achieve so far as possible the application of an objective, rather than a subjective determination of community standards. . . . To sanction convictions without expert evidence of community standards encourages the jury to condemn as obscene such conduct or materials as is personally distasteful or offensive to the particular juror. . . . It bears repetition that the determination of obscenity is for juror or judge not on the basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection or particular experience of life, but on the basis of 'contemporary community standards'." (Citations omitted.) (69 Cal. 2d at 574-575.)

The contrary statement of the Supreme Court in *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. ....., 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973), to the effect that expert testimony of obscenity standards need not be introduced by the prosecution to obtain or to sustain a conviction, has no effect on the Calif-

ornia courts. This is because the statement of the California Supreme Court is a specific holding on an evidentiary matter, and the Supreme Court's language in *Paris* and *Hamling* is merely *obiter dictum*, at least as applied to the courts within the State of California. Furthermore, this Court did not squarely meet the issue of the effect of its contrary statement in *Paris* and *Hamling* on the *Giannini* case.

The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in *Miller*, *Hamling*, and *12 200-Foot Reels of 8 mm Film* is to require that the obscenity *vel non* of any materials be determined on the basis of local community standards, whether or not the prosecution is brought pursuant to a federal statute.

> "To require a state to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard' would be an exercise in futility. * * * * *We hold the requirement that the jury evaluate the materials with reference to 'contemporary standards of the State of California' serves this protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.*" (Emphasis added.)
>
> *Miller v. California*, 93 S. Ct. at 2618, 2620.

The Court reaffirmed this position in *Hamling:*

> "Our analysis in *Miller* of the difficulty in formulating uniform national standards of obscenity, and our emphasis on the ability of the juror to ascertain the sense of the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards' without the benefit of expert evidence, clearly indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is not to be interpreted as requiring proof of

the uniform national standards which were criticized in *Miller.*" (94 S. Ct. at 2901.)

While this Court did not purport to specifically define, in any of its recent "obscenity" decisions, the geographical boundaries of the judging community, there is no question that the community must, at least, be contained within the State of California. Furthermore, while none of the decisions specifically refers to the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the states of unenumerated constitutional powers, the implication is clear that the power and the jurisdiction to make determinations with respect to questions of obscenity are left to the states.

The State of California, through the California Supreme Court, has spoken definitively with respect to certain limited questions involving obscenity. In the case of *People v. Noroff*, 67 Cal. 2d 791 (1967), and in *In re Panchot*, 70 Cal. 2d 105 (1968), the California Supreme Court has specifically held that materials demonstrating "lewd exhibition of the genitalia" are not obscene. In view of this fact, a California state prosecution involving such issues would be precluded, because the jury would be required to find that such materials are not obscene as a matter of law. Likewise, if a federal prosecution were brought within the State of California for a violation of the federal obscenity statutes, which violation involved the issue of lewd exhibition of the genitalia (as is the case with the instant appeal), the federal court would be required to dismiss the indictment. This is because the federal jury panel, being comprised, as it must, of California citizens, could not constitutionally find that the materials were obscene. The community does not change simply because the prosecution is brought pursuant to a federal

statute and the case is tried in federal court. See *Hamling, supra*, at 2901.

3. Both §§ 1461 and 1462 of Title 18, United States Code, require that the conduct proscribed therein be done knowingly. The acts of which petitioners have been convicted were protected under judicial decisions rendered prior to *Miller* and *Hamling*. Petitioners were thus relying on earlier judicial construction to serve as a guide for their conduct. Therefore, assuming, *arguendo*, that the case law now adequately describes those kinds of conduct and activities which are proscribed, and that fair notice is now provided to all, such "clear" descriptions and guidelines were not available to petitioners at the time that the offenses were originally committed. Thus, the crucial and absolutely essential element of scienter is absent.

Mr. Justice Douglas, in delivering the opinion of the Court in *Lambert v. California*, 355 U.S. 226, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957), offered the following comments with respect to the question of knowledge:

> "On the other hand, due process places some limits on its exercise. Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are assessed. Notice is required on a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act. Recent cases illustrating the point are [citations

omitted]. These cases involved only property interests in civil litigation. But the principle is equally appropriate where a person, wholly passive and *unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for condemnation in a criminal case.*" (Emphasis added.) (355 U.S. at 228, 78 S. Ct. at 243.)

The failure of the Government to establish the element of scienter, or knowledge, which is unquestionably an essential element of the instant offense, requires that the conviction be reversed as a matter of law. *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).

4. Title 18, U.S.C., §§ 1461 and 1462 proscribe conduct in language so vague and confusing that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application [thereby violating] the first essential of due process of law." *Connally v. General Construction Company*, 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926). This Court, however, has stated in *Hamling, supra*, that whatever vagueness previously existed in §§ 1461 and 1462 has now been removed as a result of its authoritative construction of those statutes. For the present, then, it appears that convictions for violations of these and similar sections may be sustained, and the offending materials may be suppressed. To impose imprisonment for the violation of statutes which have caused as much controversy and confusion as the two sections involved in the instant appeal is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

In *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958),

this Court had occasion to consider the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment:

> "The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. *The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.* While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment, and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surprising. But when the Court was confronted with a punishment of twelve years in irons at hard and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records, it did not hesitate to declare that the penalty was cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in its character. *Weems v. United States,* 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544. The Court recognized in that case that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. *The Amendment must draw its meaning*

> *from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.*" (Emphasis added.) (356 U.S. at 99 - 101, 78 S. Ct. at 597 - 598.)

Consequently, imposition of custodial punishment is violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

BURTON MARKS

A Member of BURTON MARKS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX "A"

OPINION OF THE COURT BELOW

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARVIN MILLER, COVINA PUBLISHING INC., a corporation doing business as COLLECTORS PUBLICATIONS, THE COLLECTORS CLUB and G & M ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 71-1850.

[FILED Nov. 6, 1974]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

On Remand from the Supreme Court.

Before: CHAMBERS, KOELSCH and CARTER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Supreme Court, on June 25, 1973, vacated the judgment in the above case and remanded it to this court for reconsideration. 413 U.S. 913.

We reaffirm the convictions and adopt our previously reported opinion in 455 F.2d 899, on the authority of *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and *Hamling v. United States*, 42 U.S.L.W. 5035 (June 24, 1974).

The materials in question are clearly obscene. If they were obscene under the old definition set forth in *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), it follows

that they were obscene under the new broader definition of obscenity set forth in *Miller v. California, supra.*

The defendants' contention that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (mailing obscene matter) is void for vagueness was decisively rejected in *Hamling, supra,* at 5043. The question of whether a local or a national standard should be applied in this federal prosecution was not raised below or on appeal. Expert testimony was introduced by the Government to the effect that the content of the picture magazines and the books contained no social redeeming value. The testimony did not indicate whether it was based on a local or a national standard.

In *Hamling, supra,* the Supreme Court rejected the position of the First Circuit (see, *e.g., United States v. Palladino,* 490 F.2d 499 (1973)) that a national standard must be applied in federal obscenity prosecutions. To the contrary, the Court accepted the use of "contemporary community standards" without defining the geographical limits of that community.

Miller, supra, and *Hamling, supra,* having resolved all of defendants' contentions on appeal against them, their convictions are REAFFIRMED.

LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1974

From the Office of the Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, U. S. Court of Appeals and Post Office Building, 7th & Mission Streets, P. O. Box 547, San Francisco, California 94101.

71-1850 – USA v. Marvin Miller, et al.

Dear Sir:

An opinion in the above case was filed today, and pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure a judgment was entered November 6, 1974 affirming the judgment or order of the court below (or administrative agency).

Pursuant to Rule 41(a) the mandate of this court will issue 21 days after the entry of judgment, unless the court enters an order otherwise, or grants a stay of the mandate or a petition for rehearing is filed. If a petition for rehearing is filed and denied, the mandate shall issue 7 days after the entry of the order denying the petition.

Very truly yours,

Clerk,

U. S. Court of Appeals

APPENDIX "C"

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REJECTING SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARVIN MILLER, COVINA PUBLISHING INC., a corporation doing business as COLLECTORS PUBLICATIONS, THE COLLECTORS CLUB and G & M ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 71-1850.

[FILED Jan. 6, 1975]

Before: CHAMBERS, KOELSCH and CARTER, Circuit Judges.

The panel in the above matter having voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing; and Judges Chambers and Koelsch having voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc and Judge Carter having recommended such rejection; and the suggestion for rehearing en banc having been circulated to all the active judges of the court, and no judge having voted for a rehearing en banc,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing in banc is rejected.

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

In the Supreme Court of the United States.

No. A-609.

MARVIN MILLER, ET AL., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES.

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for petitioner(s),

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, extended to and including March 6, 1975.

/s/ William J. Brennan, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States

Dated this 27th
day of January, 1975.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
County of Orange)

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and employed in the County of Orange, State of California, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action or proceeding; that

My business address is 326½ Main Street, Huntington Beach, California 92648, that on MARCH 5TH 1975, I served the within PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (No. A-609) on the following named parties by depositing the designated copies thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Post Office in the City of Huntington Beach, California, addressed to said parties at the addresses as follows:

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
312 NORTH SPRING STREET
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 [2 copies]

SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on MARCH 5TH, 1975, at HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA.

D. A. standefer

Dean-Standefer, 326½ Main St., Huntington Beach, Ca.
(714) 536-7161